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ANIMAL WELL-BEING

Bernard E. Rollin
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Colorado State University

The Creation of Transgenic Animal
“Models” for Human Genetic Disease

P

erhaps the greatest socio-ethical challenges associated with the development and use of transgenic animals in biomedical research are the problems associated with animal welfare. Whereas the issue of biosafety does, indeed, represent a major concern, the minimization of such risk is as much a
prudential concern as an ethical one for investigators, as they themselves are
put at risk by failure to provide adequate safeguards against the dangers of
transgenic animal research. Animal welfare concerns, on the other hand, represent a far greater moral challenge, for concern about animal welfare often
does not coincide with perceived self-interest and, indeed, can exact costs in
terms of self-interest, in the form of money, time, extra personnel, delay
in research, etc. In other words, many researchers have traditionally not
equated concern for animal welfare with self-interest and are, thus, unlikely
to do the right thing for reasons of self-interest. Somewhat mitigating this
blanket statement is the relatively recent acknowledgement of the fact that
failure to assure animal welfare can skew variables relevant to research and
actually compromise research (Rollin, 1990), but nonetheless, the coincidence of the two is far from perfect. As we shall see, certain aspects of transgenic animal research do represent an area where welfare could be ignored
without obviously jeopardizing the work in question. Thus moral concern
must take up the slack left after prudential considerations are exhausted.
The emergence of a systematic social ethic whose purview extends to the
treatment of laboratory animals is a relatively recent phenomenon, as evidenced by the fact that researchers basically enjoyed carte blanche in the use
of animals until the mid 1980s (Rollin, 1991). For most of the 19th and 20th
centuries, the only consensus ethical principle extant in society for the treatment of animals was a prohibition against overt, willful, intentional, needless, wanton cruelty, as expressed in anti-cruelty legislation. Concerned as
much with ferreting out sadistic individuals who might begin with animals
and move to humans as with protecting animals, these laws, therefore, did
not address “normal,” “necessary” or “beneficial” sources of animal suffering

such as agriculture, research, hunting, trapping or education; these are typically exempted from the anti-cruelty laws by statute, or else have been excluded by judicial decision. Rather, the laws focused on deviant behavior
leading to “unnecessary” animal suffering. It is only in the past decade that
society has begun to realize that a mere fraction of animal suffering is a result
of overt cruelty—the vast majority of animal suffering at human hands, in
fact, grows out of such decent motivations as increasing knowledge, curing
disease, increasing efficiency of food production, protecting humans against
toxic substances and so on. Correlative with this realization has come a demand for the control of suffering in areas of animal use which previously enjoyed laissez faire, notably toxicity testing, animal research and animal agriculture. First to be directly affected by this demand was animal research, with
two major pieces of federal legislation designed to assure the welfare of research animals passed in the U.S. in 1985.
Perhaps the main feature of this legislation, which I have discussed at
length elsewhere (Rollin, 1989; 1991), is a mandate to control pain, suffering
and distress in research animals except where scientifically necessary, as in
the study of pain, and even there, to minimize it as far as possible. Second,
the legislation is designed to assure “enforced self-regulation” of animal research and dialogue about animal welfare concerns, through the vehicle of
protocol and facilities review by animal care committees. Third, the legislation suggests that welfare concerns are not limited to controlling overt pain
and suffering, but actually points towards providing some positive opportunity for animals to express their biological and behavioral natures—this is
exemplified by the requirements of exercise for dogs and provision of an environment conducive to the psychological well-being of primates. This legislation has already had many salubrious effects on the welfare of laboratory
animals, perhaps the most dramatic being the focusing of scientific attention
on recognizing, characterizing and alleviating animal pain. It has also led researchers to far greater awareness of ethical questions in research, something
which was traditionally stifled by widespread belief that science is and ought
to be, “value-free” (Rollin, 1989).
Thus, we see the emergence of a new ethic for animals demanding, in essence, maximization of the interests of animals while they are being used for
human benefit. The most articulate expression of this ethic thus far, has been
the demand for the control of animal pain and suffering in research.
For certain aspects of transgenic animal use, this demand will be relatively easy to satisfy. Consider, for example, the patented Harvard mouse
which is disposed to the development of tumors. In the words of the patent,
this is “an animal whose germ cells and somatic cells contain an activated
oncogene sequence introduced into the animal...which increases the probability of the development of neoplasms (particularly malignant tumors) in
the animal” (U.S. Patent Number 4,873,191). Minimizing pain and suffering
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for such an animal is, in principle and in fact, no different from minimizing
pain and suffering in nontransgenic animals in whom tumors are induced by
other means: the establishment of endpoints for euthanasia, in terms of tumor size, so that the animal does not suffer, and the judicious use of anesthetics, analgesics and tranquilizers during operative or other procedures.
Similarly, there is no reason the second major thrust of the new social
ethic cannot be applied to these transgenic animals—namely the provision of
enriched environments and husbandry systems for these animals which allow
them to actualize their behavioral and biological natures. In the case of transgenic mice, for instance, one should look to the recommendations outlined
in literature on care of mice; for example, a recent article described a caging
system for rodents that is meant to accommodate their behavioral needs
(Sharmann, 1991). Indeed, the characterization of such environments and
systems for a variety of animals is a primary purpose of the chapters in a
book I am currently editing (Rollin and Kesel, in press). Thus, the vast majority of transgenic animals developed so far raise no additional welfare issues beyond those concerning nontransgenic laboratory animals.
Indeed, those welfare issues which are raised dramatically by transgenic
animals are also continuous with analogous nontransgenic cases. I am referring to the creation and maintenance of seriously defective animals which are
developed and propagated to model some human disease. This was traditionally accomplished through identification of adventitious mutations and selective breeding. Transgenic technology allows for accomplishing the same
goal far more quickly and in a far wider range of areas. One can essentially
replicate, in principle, any human genetic disease in animals—and therein
lies the major ethical concern growing out of transgenic technology.
A recent chapter in a book devoted to transgenic animals helps to focus
the concern:
There are over 3,000 known genetic diseases. The medical costs
as well as the social and emotional costs of genetic disease
are enormous. Monogenic diseases account for 10% of all admissions to pediatric hospitals in North America... and 8.5%
of all pediatric deaths.. .. They affect 1% of all liveborn infants. .. and they cause 7% of stillbirths and neonatal deaths.
... Those survivors with genetic diseases frequently have significant physical, developmental, or social impairment. . . .
At present, medical intervention provides complete relief in
only about 12% of Mendelian single-gene diseases; in nearly
half of all cases, attempts at therapy provide no help at all
(Karson, 1991.)
This is the context in which one needs to think about the animal welfare issues growing out of the use of transgenic animals in biomedical research.

Animal Well-Being

On one hand, it is dear that researchers will embrace the creation of animal
models of human genetic disease as soon as it is technically feasible to do so.
Such models, which introduce the defective human genetic machinery into
the animal genome, appear to researchers to provide convenient, inexpensive
and—most importantly—high fidelity models for the study of the gruesome
panoply of human genetic diseases outlined in the over three thousand pages
of text comprising the sixth edition of the standard work on genetic disease,
The Metabolic Basis of Inherited Disease (Scriver et al., 1989). Such “high fidelity models” may well reduce the numbers of animals used in research, a
major consideration for animal welfare, but are more likely to increase the
numbers as more researchers engage in hitherto impossible animal research.
On the other hand, the creation of such animals can generate inestimable
amounts of pain and suffering for these animals since genetic diseases, as
mentioned above, often involve symptoms of great severity. The obvious
question then becomes the following: Given that such animals will surely be
developed wherever possible for the full range of human genetic disease, how
can one assure that vast numbers of these animals do not live lives of constant
pain and distress? Such a concern is directly in keeping with the emerging
social ethic for the treatment of animals; as we said, one can plausibly argue
that minimizing pain and distress is the core of recent federal legislation concerning animal use in research.
The very first attempt to produce an animal “model” for human genetic
disease by transgenic means, as mentioned earlier, was the development, by
embryonic stem cell technology, of a mouse which was designed to replicate
Lesch-Nyhan’s disease, or hypoxanthine-guanine-phosphororibosyl transferase (HRPT) deficiency (Hooper et al., 1987; Keuhn et al., 1987). LeschNyhan’s disease is a particularly horrible genetic disease, leading to a “devastating and untreatable neurologic and behavioral disorder” (Kelley and
Wyngaarden, 1983). Patients rarely live beyond their third decade and suffer
from spasticity, mental retardation and choreoathetosis. The most unforgettable and striking aspect of the disease, however, is an irresistible compulsion
to self-mutilate, usually manifesting itself as biting fingers and lips. The following clinical description conveys the terrible nature of the disease:
The most striking neurologic feature of the Lesch-Nyhan syn drome is compulsive self-destructive behavior—between 2 and
16 years of age, affected children begin to bite their fingers,
lips and buccal mucosa. This compulsion for self-mutilation
becomes so extreme that it may be necessary to keep the elbows in extension with splints, or to wrap the hands with gauze
or restrain them in some other manner. In several patients, mutilation of lips could only be controlled by extraction of teeth.
The compulsive urge to inflict painful wounds appears
to grip the patient irresistibly. Often he [sic] will be content
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until one begins to remove an arm splint. At this point a communicative patient will plead that the restraints be left alone.
If one continues in freeing the arm, the patient will become
extremely agitated and upset. When completely unrestrained,
he will begin to put the fingers into his mouth. An older patient will plead for help and if one then takes hold of the arm
that has previously been freed, the patient will show obvious
relief. If help is not forthcoming, a painful and often severe
injury may be inflicted. The apparent urge to bite fingers is
often not symmetrical. In many patients it is possible to leave
one arm unrestrained without concern, even though freeing the
other would result in an immediate attempt at self-mutilation.
These patients also attempt to injure themselves in other
ways, by hitting their heads against inanimate objects or by
placing their extremities in dangerous places, such as in between the spokes of a wheelchair. If the hands are unrestrained,
their mutilation becomes the patient’s main concern and effort
to inflict injury in some other manner seems to be sublimated
(Kelley and Wyngaarden, 1983).
At the present, “there is no effective therapy for the neurologic complications
of the Lesch-Nyhan’s syndrome”(Stout and Caskey, 1988). Thus Kelley and
Wyngaarden, in their chapter on HRPT-deficiency diseases, boldly suggest
that “the preferred form of therapy for complete HRPT-deficiency (LeschNyhan’s syndrome) at the present time is prevention,” i.e. “therapeutic abortion” (Kelley and Wyngaarden, 1983). This disease is so dramatic that I predicted almost a decade ago that it would probably be the first disease for which
genetic researchers would attempt to create a model by genetic engineering.
Researchers have sought animal models for this syndrome for decades
and have created rats and monkeys that will self-mutilate by administration
of caffeine and other drugs (Boyd et al., 1965). Thus, it is not surprising that
the first disease genetically engineered by embryonic stem cell technology
was, indeed, Lesch-Nyhan’s disease (Hooper et al., 1987; Keuhn et al., 1987).
However, these animals were phenotypically normal and displayed none of
the metabolic or neurologic symptoms characteristic of the disease in humans. The reasons for this are unknown (Stout and Caskey, 1988).
This case provides us with an interesting context for our animal welfare
discussion. Although the animals were, in fact, asymptomatic, presumably at
some point in the future researchers will be able to generate a symptomatic
model transgenically. Let us at least assume that this can occur—if it cannot,
there is no animal welfare issue to concern us! Whether one ought to create
such animals is a question I have addressed elsewhere (Rollin, 1986). The practical moral question that arises is clear: Given that researchers will certainly
generate such animals as quickly as they are able to do so, how can one assure
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that the animals live lives that are not characterized by the same pain and distress which they are created to model?
Again, this question does not differ in kind from the moral questions associated with developing traditional chronic animal models of human disease, be it by breeding, pharmacological manipulation or tissue destruction.
The difference is in degree—transgenics provides the potential for generating vast numbers of animals modeling genetic diseases with devastating
symptoms. A second difference lies in the fact that transgenic technology is
developing at precisely the same time that social/ethical demand for controlling pain and suffering in research animals is at its historical peak and seems
to be increasing.
Regrettably, researchers in the past have been cavalier in controlling
pain and suffering in animals used as chronic disease models. Though many
of the animals have required extraordinary amounts of care and husbandry,
such efforts have been directed, for the most part, at keeping the animals
alive and scientifically functional rather than at controlling pain and suffering. Given our current social ethic, it is increasingly imperative that pain and
suffering be controlled in all animals used for research. Thus, concern for
this dimension of animal care needs to be a fundamental principle which
guides those contemplating the transgenic creation of animals which replicate human genetic disease. Such an issue is a true moral challenge for researchers, as concern for the animals’ quality of life will undoubtedly make
things more difficult and expensive for researchers. At the same time, it is
patent that such concern is both morally and socially obligatory. Furthermore, failure to assure the public that animal suffering is being minimized
could well accelerate major political constraints on all areas of biotechnology
(Rollin, 1986).
Unfortunately, because the research community traditionally ignored
this moral component of animal research, there is no vast literature on controlling pain and suffering in chronically defective animals. There has probably been more scientific attention to such questions during the six years following the passage of the aforementioned federal legislation than in the entire previous history of animal research (Rollin, 1989). Doubtless such attention will continue to grow at a significant rate. Researchers undertaking work
with animals which model human genetic disease should, therefore, vector
these concerns into protocol planning and budgeting; funding agencies
should demand such planning, and animal care and use committees should
not approve projects until they have evidenced that pain, suffering and distress are controlled.
In many cases—perhaps in a symptomatic Lesch-Nyhan’s animal—management of suffering may require a far more radical approach than the standard uses of anesthesia, analgesia and tranquilization, which are, by and
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large, used for short periods of time. If a defective animal is to be kept alive
for long periods and is likely to experience pain and suffering during that period, researchers should consider the possibility of effecting total elimination
of consciousness. One such approach could involve surgically rendering an
animal decerebrate, so that, while vegetative functions are extant, the animal’s
subjective experience has been shut down. Alternatively, and perhaps more
viably, one could render an animal irreversibly comatose so that it was effectively anesthetized throughout its life. Unfortunately, virtually no literature
exists on induction of coma.
I have galvanized a team of researchers at Colorado State University to
explore this drastic possibility. We utilize animals scheduled to be euthanized
for other reasons and attempt to induce irreversible coma in these animals by
induction of cerebral hypoxia. We hope to find a clear EEG criterion which
signals coma. If the method is successful, perhaps the method could be taught
to veterinarians at institutions planning to utilize animal models of genetic
disease so that the animals will not needlessly suffer.
Obviously, such methods of controlling pain and suffering are very drastic and their effective application is fraught with difficulties. For example,
they could, presumably, only be employed where higher brain function is essentially irrelevant to the study of the disease. Whether this is the case or not
with Lesch-Nyhan’s disease, for example, once it was established that the transgenic animal, indeed, showed all signs of the disease, is unclear. I believe it is.
Certainly, at least some metabolic genetic diseases could be studied in this way.
Equally significant, there is something aesthetically, at least and perhaps
morally as well (I am not clear on this), about deliberately creating such animals. At the very least, it dramatically perpetuates the notion that society is
seeking to transcend—that animals are simply tools for human expedient
use. It is, in my view, the lesser of two evils.
The key point is that this dimension of genetic engineering of animals
cannot be ignored. There is, as we saw, every reason to believe that transgenic
animals will be created to study human genetic disease as soon as the technological capability exists to do so. Extant laws permit such animals to be created. The mindset of the research community makes it inevitable. It is also
clear that such diseases can cause enormous amounts of pain and suffering.
In the face of this development, responsible researchers need to explore all
possible avenues for controlling such pain and suffering. These approaches
should include such established methods as the liberal use of anesthetics, analgesics and tranquilizers, and by making as much of the research as possible
acute. But these methods are unlikely to be effective in the case of those diseases where suffering begins at birth or is chronic after a certain stage of development. (Lesch-Nyhan’s patients, as we mentioned, do not show symptoms from birth, but do exhibit them chronically after their onset.) Thus,
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methodologies need to be developed which will control pain and suffering
over extended periods of time. There is, thus far, no reason to believe that the
research community has yet engaged this issue vis d vis animals used in other
chronically painful work, let alone in genetically engineered animals. The
development of such methodologies for controlling pain and suffering is
likely to be exportable to numerous areas of animal research, not only transgenic creation of disease. Only in this way can research attempt to stay in harmony with the ethical stance of the society which allows and supports it.
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